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AND WHAT IF IT CATCHES ON FIRE?: THE FAA'S
INEFFECTUAL STANCE ON POST-CRASH FIRE
PREVENTION IN AIRLINE ACCIDENTS
ANGELA L. BRACKBILL
I. INTRODUCTIONF IRE IS the curse of the airline industry.' Fire safety be-
came a key Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issue
in part because of the 1983 Air Canada crash of Flight 797
in Cincinnati in which twenty-three lives were lost. Many of
the victims died from breathing "toxic fumes emitted by
burning cabin material. '2 All forty-one passengers aboard
Flight 797 survived the emergency landing.' When fire en-
gulfed the plane, however, twenty-three people perished
within one minute from inhaling toxic fumes released by
burning seats, walls, and fabrics.' The airline industry has
made progress since 1983 in the areas of fire prevention
and safety, but there is still much room for improvement. 5
Chances are that as long as the Discretionary Function Ex-
ception (DFE) protects the FAA from liability for refusing
to make these changes, only minimal improvements will be
required.
David Nolan, Airline Safety: The Shocking Truth, DISCOVER, Oct. 1986, at 30.
Linda Kanamine, Tragedy Renews Cailfor Fire Safety, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 1990, at
IlA.
3 Edward Dolnick, Aviation Safety Changes May Cut Injuries in Airplane Fires, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 5, 1983.
4 Id. The majority of those who died were asphyxiated by a lethal combination of
hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide, and other poisonous gases released by burn-
ing seat cushions. Id.
NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FIRE 1965
THROUGH 1974 AND FACTORS AFFECTING THE STATISTICS, Rpt. No. NTSB-AAS-77-1
(1977) [hereinafter U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS 1965-1974].
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Research has proven that many plane crashes are surviv-
able.6 In fact, a study by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) of fatal airline accidents from 1969 through
the middle of 1983 showed that sixty percent of passengers
aboard survived the crash.7 Nonetheless, two times as many
passengers perish from fire and smoke as from the actual
impact of the crash.8
This comment will discuss the history of the FAA in devel-
oping, implementing, and policing compliance of the air-
line industry with fire safety requirements. The FAA has
not only failed to foster development of safety precaution
technology, but also has chosen to ignore the technologies
available to make air travel safer for the airline passenger.
The FAA has a duty to ensure the safety of the traveling
public by requiring that aircraft meet certain standards.
How it enforces those requirements is entirely within the
discretion of the FAA and is a decision which is protected
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Discretionary
Function Exception. The FAA chooses to allow manufac-
turers total control of testing during the manufacturing
process and has taken such a hands-off approach that often
not even a spot-check occurs. The DFE allows the FAA to
shirk its duty and avoid liability for injuries incurred in air-
plane accidents, laying the responsibility at the feet of the
manufacturer.
The government defines in the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions (FARs) the important standards for the airline indus-
try, but the FAA has done little to develop new regulations
governing fire precautions and even less to enforce the reg-
ulations that have been implemented. 9 Proposals have
been set forth by various agencies, including the Aviation
Safety Institute and Association of Flight Attendants, for in-
creased fire prevention and evacuation time in post-crash
6 Nolan, supra note 1, at 30. The chances of surviving a low-impact crash today
are no better than they were three decades ago, and may even be worse. Id.
7Id.
8 Id.
9 Philip M. Foss & Robert D. Tepper, Fire Safety in Transport Category Aircraft: Liti-
gating a Post-Crash or In-Flight Aircraft Fire, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 801, 819 (1984).
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fires. 10 Few proposals are adopted and even those few are
not required on older aircraft until the plane undergoes a
major renovation, allowing the airlines years, in some in-
stances, to implement the required changes.'
Despite the statistics, the FAA asserts that it is reluctant to
impose new safety requirements on the airline industry un-
til the effects of smoke and toxicity in aircraft fatalities are
certain.12 The financial costs of making the improvements,
however, play an obvious role in the airline industry's deci-
sion not to make improvements. One estimation is that
over a ten year period, settlements for crash fatalities will
average $10 million; improvements to prevent those deaths
would cost $75 million. 3 Clearly the costs to the airlines
outweigh the benefits, especially considering the present fi-
nancial state of the airline industry.
Furthermore, the Discretionary Function Exception of
the FTCA"4 exempts the FAA from any liability for failing to
enforce compliance with safety requirements.' 5  Section
2680 of the United States Code 16 allows an exemption for
any government employee exercising discretion in taking a
10 Kanamine, supra note 2, at 11A.
11 Id.
12 Marjorie Sun, Airplane Fire Safety Debate Rekindled; Critics Charge the FAA is Still
Dragging its Feet in Requiring Stiffer Standards, SCIENCE, July 1, 1983, at 35.
13 Nolan, supra note 1, at 30.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). Waiver of sovereign immunity is allowed
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
Id.
'15 United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797,
821 (1984) [hereinafter Varig Airlines] (holding that the duty to ensure that an air-
craft conforms to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator,
while the FAA retains responsibility for policing compliance).
16 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
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policy-based action.17 This exception applies even in cases
where the employee has abused that discretion.18
There are several options available to enhance airline
safety and to decrease the chances that a plane will ignite
when it crashes. The agency response, however, is that the
costs of implementing these precautions and renovating
the whole fleet far outweigh the benefits of lives saved. This
comment will focus on what the FAA has done or not done
to fulfill its duty to promote flight safety and whether the
DFE should apply to those situations in which the govern-
ment undertakes to ensure the safety of the public. By ex-
ploring the means by which the FAA currently regulates the
industry and what could be done to further ensure fire
safety, the comment will argue for a higher standard for the
government and a narrower reading of the Discretionary
Function Exception in instances where safety is a considera-
tion. Holding the government liable would force the FAA
to observe a higher standard in enforcing compliance with
safety regulations.
II. HISTORY OF FIRE SAFETY IN THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY
One of the first American jet airliner fire disasters oc-
curred in 1961 when a United DC-8 veered off the runway
at Denver and burned. Sixteen passengers died.19 The
FAA has promised action since the 1961 crash in Denver,
yet relatively little has been done to deal with the dangers
17 Id. The § 2680(a) exception reads in part:
The provisions of this chapter and § 1346(b) of this title shall not ap-
ply to-(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused.
Id.
18 Id.
19 Nolan, supra note 1, at 30.
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associated with the toxicity of flammable aircraft interior
materials.2 0
Eleven years after the Denver accident, two accidents in Chi-
cago, twelve days apart, claimed fifty-three lives, thirty-seven
of them persons who survived the impact only to perish in
the post-crash fires. The FAA promised action at that time.
Five years later, sixteen years after the Denver accident, a
DC-9 en route to Atlanta crashed on a highway. Of the
forty-three persons who survived the impact, twenty died
from fire or asphyxia. Once again the FAA promised ac-
tion. Nineteen years after the Denver accident, seven years
after the Chicago accidents, and three years after the At-
lanta accident, we have new promises of more studies from
the FAA with no timetable for completion. 1
A. INTERIOR MATERIALS
1. Prior to 1970
Statistics for the period from 1955 to 1974 show that the
percentage of fire-related accidents to total accidents indi-
cated an upward trend in fire accident potential.2 2 From
1964 to 1977, 39% of the 1162 deaths resulting from air-
craft accidents were attributable to fire. 23  In these acci-
dents, the usual cause of death was not fire, but rather
asphyxiation by smoke and toxic fumes.24 A number of air-
craft fires in the early 1960s prompted proposals for more
stringent standards to reduce the flammability of cabin
materials.25 Prior to the 1960s, cabin materials were re-
- Id.
21 Id. (quoting former NTSB chairman James King); see also U.S. AIR CARmER Acci-
DENrs 1965-1974, supra note 5, at 8.
22 U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS 1965-1974, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that although
the likelihood of an accident had decreased, the chances of fire being a factor when
an accident did occur had increased).
22 See Sun, supra note 12; see also Foss & Tepper, supra note 9, at 801.
24 Foss & Tepper, supra note 9, at 801. Synergism, the combining of toxic gases, is
lethal to humans and is an aspect of post-crash fire that cannot be ignored. Many
fatalities can be attributed to inhalation of the smoke and toxic fumes emitted by
burning cabin materials. Although the effects of synergism on humans are not
known absolutely, the theory is that exposure to a combination of gases is more
hazardous than being exposed to the gases individually. Id. at 819-820.
25 U.S. AIR CARRIER AccIDENTS 1965-1974, supra note 5, at 21.
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quired to be at least flash-resistant. The other interior
materials, however, such as upholstery, carpet, floor, wall
and ceiling panels, and furnishings had only to be flame
resistant.26 Although proposals were made during the mid
to late 1960s, no regulations were adopted at that time for
either the reduction of flammability of cabin materials or
for smoke emission standards.27 When the amendments for
reduction of flammability of cabin materials were finally
adopted, the airline industry claimed that some of the spec-
ified materials were unavailable and thus the standards
were relaxed. 28 The unhurried pace of the government in
implementing and enforcing the minimum safety standards
left a total lack of regulation in the area of smoke emis-
sions29 and more importantly, allowed flight in the 1960s by
aircraft which merely complied with flight safety standards
adopted in the 1940s.30
2. Post 1970
In the mid 1970s the FAA attempted to rectify the prob-
lem. The FAA proposed three regulatory actions that
would prove to have a significant impact on interior flam-
mability and smoke emission attributes.31 First, FARs gov-
erning cabin interior materials were amended to require
that three years after the effective date of the amendment,
self-extinguishing materials would be installed on all air-
craft.32 Secondly, the FAA proposed research to obtain in-
formation on the possibility of establishing minimum
standards for the toxic fumes emitted from burning cabin
materials.33 Finally, the FAA issued a proposal in 1975 es-
26 Id. at 20. Flash-resistant is defined as "not susceptible to burning violently
when ignited." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1993). Flame-resistant is defined as "not susceptible
to combustion to the point of propagating a flame, beyond safe limits, after the
ignition source is removed." 14 C.F.IL § 1.1 (1993).
27 U.S. AIR CARRIER AccIDENTS 1965-1974, supra note 5, at 21.
28 Id.
29 Id.






tablishing smoke density standards for emissions from
burning cabin materials. 34 To date, both smoke density
standards and minimum smoke emission standards are in
place.3 5 In spite of these improvements, however, fires con-
tinue to cause the deaths of many airline passengers in
otherwise survivable accidents. 36
B. SAFER COMMITTEE REPORT
In 1978, the Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduc-
tion Committee (SAFER) was formed to "examine the fac-
tors affecting the ability of the aircraft cabin occupant to
survive in the post-crash environment and the range of solu-
tions available."3 7  The SAFER investigation concentrated
on three problem areas in the airline industry. The re-
search involved development of less toxic, less flammable
cabin materials that emit fewer fumes, the creation of jet
fuel additives which make fuel less likely to mist and thus
decrease the chances of a fireball, and finally, furtherance
of understanding the nature of post-crash and inflight fires
by the development of mathematical models.3 8 The pri-
mary focus of the committee, however, was on survival of a
post-crash fire and whether the problems of fuel spillage
and cabin material flammability adversely affect a passen-
ger's chances of escaping.3 9 The results of the SAFER study
found that in those survivable accidents where post-crash
fires occurred, a large percentage of the fatalities could be
34 Id. at 23.
'4 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.851, 25.1181, 25.1207, 25.1451 (1994).
Foss & Tepper, supra note 9, at 801. "Survivable crash" is defined as "one in
which seats remain bolted to the fuselage, seat belts function properly and passen-
gers are not hit by flying metal or other debris." Twenty percent of all fatalities in
"survivable" air crashes are caused by subsequent fire or smoke, and 80% of all air
accidents are survivable. John M. Broder & Paul Houston, Fire-Resistance of Damaged
Planes is Vigorously Debated Safety Issue, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1988, at 18.
-7 Implementation of SAFER Propulsion System Recommendations, 49 Fed. Reg.
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attributed to the fire.4 0 Spilled fuel proved to be the pri-
mary cause of post-crash fire.4' Consequently the commit-
tee centered its efforts on discovering means of controlling
fire and explosion in order to enhance a passenger's
chance of escape from a burning aircraft.42
The Committee recommended that the FAA require the
airlines to provide fuel tank vent protection during ground
fires4 3 and to explore means of maximizing fuel supply shut
off in likely post-crash fire situations.44 More importantly,
the SAFER committee recommended improvement and
standardization of investigations into aircraft accidents and
enhancement of materials which prevent the spread of
post-crash fires. 5 The recommendations of the SAFER
Committee spurred the FAA to consider for use in aircraft
seat cushions fire-blocking materials designed to retard ig-
nition and delay involvement of the cushion with the fire.46
C. AvIATION SAFETY RESEARCH ACT
1. FAA Has Been Less Than Diligent in Research &
Development
It was not until 1988, when the Aviation Safety Research
Act (the Act) was passed, that the FAA was required to re-
40 1 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DEPT. OF TRANsP. FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL AvIA-
TION FIRE AND EXPLOSION REDUCTION (SAFER) ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (June 26,
1980) [hereinafter FINAL SAFER REPORT].
41 Id. at 12-13 (noting that in-flight cabin fires producing fatal injuries were deter-
mined to be relatively rare events).
42 Id.
43 Id.
4' Id. The SAFER Committee also recommended that the FAA look into the use
of self-contained smoke masks, gloves, clothing or other items of personal protec-
tion for crew members to allow better supervision of evacuation procedures. FINAL
SAFER REPORT, supra note 40, at 18.
45 FINAL SAFER REPORT, supra note 40, at 18-19.
46 See Foss & Tepper, supra note 9, at 807. These features save lives by reducing
smoke and toxic fumes from burning cabin materials and by giving passengers an
extra one-and-one-half minutes to evacuate the burning aircraft. Katherine Foran,
Pilots and Luck Made All the Difference, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1989, at 16. Fire-blocking
seat covers are required on planes with passenger capacity of 30 or more. Laura
Parker, In Wake of Delta Crash, a Renewed Look at Airliner Cabin Safety, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 1988, at A25.
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search the topic of fire safety.4 7 Because the FAA has made
no notable effort to better understand and alleviate the
toxic threat of a post-crash fire situation,48 concentrating in-
stead on the areas of "improvement" and "orderly develop-
ment,"49 the Act designated that $21 million of the safety
research funds should be directed to safety projects and
that the remaining $21 million should be concentrated on
long term research projects.5" The change increased the
funding for long term research from two percent to fifteen
percent of the available funds.51
The committee drafting the Act took the position that
although significant progress has been made since 1980 in
the implementation of less flammable seat covers and seat
cushions, the FAA remains seriously deficient in its under-
standing of the "hazards of human exposure to toxic gases
in aircraft fires."5 2 The Act forces the FAA to take action by
calling for improved research in such areas as less flamma-
11 Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988, H.R. REP. No. 894, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4079, 4080 [hereinafter Research Act].
Section 312(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.
§ 1353(b)) is amended as follows: The Administrator shall undertake
or supervise research to develop technologies and to conduct data
analyses for predicting the effects of aircraft design, maintenance, test-
ing, wear, and fatigue on the life of aircraft and on air safety, to de-
velop methods of analyzing and improving aircraft maintenance
technology and practices (including nondestructive evaluation of air-
craft structures), to assess the fire and smoke resistance of aircraft
materials, to develop improved fire and smoke resistant materials for
aircraft interiors, to develop and improve fire and smoke containment
systems for in-flight aircraft fires, and to develop advanced aircraft fu-
els with low flammability and technologies for containment of aircraft
fuels for the purpose of minimizing post-crash fire hazards.
Id. at 1-2.
48 Id. at 8 (citing the SAFER Committee's investigation which obtained incom-
plete information on the dangers of human inhalation of synergized gases emitted
from burning fuel or interior materials). The Committee also noted that although
the actual effect of the fumes is not known, the potential threat is real. Id.
49 Id. at 6.
so Id. at 18.
51 Id. at 4. A long-term research project is defined as "a discrete project in the
aviation research plan ...which is unlikely to result in a final rulemaking action
within 5 years or in initial installation of operational equipment within 10 years,
after the date of the commencement of such project." Id. at 5.
52 Research Act, supra note 47, at 8.
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ble cabin materials, jet fuel additives to make fuel less flam-
mable, and systems to contain fire.53
2. Passenger Safety Takes Precedence over Economic
Considerations
It is a widely held belief that the FAA looks to short term
rather than long term results in the area of fire safety and
that if implementing safety precautions is "too expensive to
be practical," then the FAA will forego implementation.54
Passenger safety is a priority and the fact that a certain stan-
dard of safety is difficult or costly to achieve is not recog-
nized by the drafters of the Act as a valid excuse for
allowing passengers to die.5 5 The FAA makes premature
decisions regarding the implementation of fire safety pre-
cautions by asserting that the improvements are too costly
before conducting research on the matter.56 The cost-ben-
efit analysis should be done when the improvements are
known, not when they are simply speculative. The fact
that certain improvements have already been made has no
bearing on whether new technology should be developed
and the financial burden is not an acceptable reason to im-
pede research.5
III. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The FTCA does not provide a blanket waiver to the gov-
ernment of tort liability, but rather retains governmental
immunity through exceptions such as section 2680(a),
which extends immunity to actions taken in the exercise of
5 Research Act, supra note 47, at 8-9; see also Parker, supra note 46 for a discussion
of proposals made to improve crashworthiness of aircraft and decrease likelihood of
post-crash fires.
54 Research Act, supra note 47, at 12.
55 Id. If the FAA were fulfilling its duty to ensure the safety of air passengers, it
would strive toward the creation of a totally fire-resistant cabin, or at least the devel-
opment of materials which would retard fire long enough to allow passengers five to
ten minutes to escape a burning plane. The FAA should work toward this goal re-





a discretionary duty.5 9 Although the FTCA waives sovereign
immunity to a limited extent, the intent of the act was not
to subject the government to "novel and unprecedented lia-
bilities. '60  Rather, the DFE exemption of the FTCA pro-
tects the Government from any "liability that would
seriously handicap efficient government operations."61 Spe-
cifically, Congress intended the exemption to protect deci-
sions of government employees which are judgment-based
or made in consideration of public policy. 62
A. THE GA UBERT TWO-STEP ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE
SCOPE OF THE DFE
1. Does the Conduct Involve Judgment?
Generally, a policy-based decision is one that establishes,
promulgates or repeals a regulation.63 In order to deter-
mine whether a policy judgment has been made, it must
first be determined whether the act or omission of the gov-
ernment employee involved an element of judgment.64
The focus should be on whether the decision maker consid-
ered public policy in making his judgment.65 If the govern-
ment employee is merely applying mandated standards,
then his activity is not policy-based and thus not protected
by the DFE.66 A decision is discretionary when there are no
59 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988); see also C.R.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 795
(8th Cir. 1993).
60 Richard B. Sorenson, Use of the FTCA Discretionary Function Exception in Sonic
Boom and Low Overflight Litigation, 33 A.F. L. REv. 137, 138 (1990). The legislative
history of the Discretionary Function Exception reveals a Congressional intention to
disallow suits against the government which inhibit the formulation of political, eco-
nomic, and social policy. Mitchell E.F. Plave, Comment, United States v. Varig Air-
lines: The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of Government Liability Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 197, 203 (1985).
61 Sorenson, supra note 60, at 138 quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,
163 (1963); see also supra note 17 for a discussion of § 2680(a).
62 Walter H. Boone, Tort Liability-Governmental Immunity-Discretionary Function
Exception to Federal Tort Claims Act is Not Applicable When Regulatory Acts are Mandated by
Statute, Regulation or Policy, 59 Miss. L.J. 607 (1989).
63 Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1981).
64 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991); see also Myers v. United
States, 17 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 1993); C.R.S., 11 F.3d at 795.
61 Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974).
66 Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979).
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mandatory regulations or policies for an agency to follow in
making its decision.67 To fall within the scope of the DFE,
the directive must set out clear and specific guidelines to
direct the employee's actions.6 8
2. Is the Conduct Protected by the DFE?
If the action involves an element of choice, it must be
determined whether the government action falls within the
protection of the DFE. The second phase of the analysis is
a determination of whether the actions are based on con-
siderations of social, economic, or political policy.69 The
DFE will only immunize the actions of a government em-
ployee if that choice furthers the purposes of a regulatory
regime that gives an employee such discretion.70 It is not
necessary that the employee have consciously considered
these policy factors, but rather that he could have-if the
decision is "susceptible to policy analysis. "71
In a cost-benefit analysis, the decision maker must be free
to choose a course of action in the best interest of basic
government policy.72 Freedom from liability is necessary to
ensure this independence of action.73 A balancing of safety
considerations against those of economics is legitimate, but
cost efficiency alone is insufficient to justify protection from
immunity. The government's action must be of the type
intended to be protected by the DFE. 4
3. DFE Does Not Extend to Negligent Actions
In order to ensure the safety of those affected by the deci-
sion, however, the protection of the exemption extends
only to harms arising from the non-negligent implementa-
67 C.A.S., 11 F.3d at 796.
68 Id. at 799-800.
6 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323.
70 Id. at 324-25; see also Griffin, 500 F.2d at 1066.
71 C..S., 11 F.3d at 796 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325-26).
72 Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1980).
73 Id.
74 C.A.S., 11 F.3d at 802.
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tion of a decision imposed by statute. 5 When a statutorily
authorized action is implemented with due care by a gov-
ernment employee, that action falls within the scope of pro-
tection offered by the DFE.76 The protection does not
extend, however, to violations of statutes, regulation or pol-
icy, and should not extend to negligent implementation of
a discretionary decision.77 The FAA has never been held
liable in the negligent issuance of an airworthiness certifi-
cate, most likely because the issuance of certificates of that
type has traditionally been treated as discretionary action. 8
The three objectives of the exemption are to ensure con-
tinuation of certain governmental activities without threat
of disruption by damage suits, to prevent opening the
United States to liability for frivolous or excessive claims,
and to prevent the extension of the FTCA to cover suits for
which the claimants have alternative remedies available.79
In order to determine when a government employee falls
within the protection of the DFE, the focus is on the nature
of his conduct and whether that conduct falls within the
ambit of that which Congress intended to protect.80 A
course of action which is not a direct result of an em-
ployee's personal judgment, but rather is prescribed by stat-
75 Boone, supra note 62, at 607. If the government can show that there were pol-
icy judgments involved in a certification decision, they may rebut allegations of neg-
ligence; but proof that the certification process involves a more routine and less
discretionary application of objective requirements may subject the government to
liability. Id.
76 Id.
7 John W. Bagby & Gary L. Gittings, The Elusive Discretionary Function Exception
from Government Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of Federal Liability, 30 AM. Bus. L.J.
223, 232-34 (1992).
78 Lawrence v. United States, 381 F.2d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Morrell, 331 F.2d 498, 502 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964);
Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321, 323-34 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 977 (1952).
7 Sorenson, supra note 60, at 138.
-o Id. at 140; see also Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813. The DFE is not a blanket
exclusion from liability for all acts of government employees, but protects only those
decisions based on choice. The choice must be "grounded in social, economic, [or]
political policy" or must represent a "policy judgment." Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 335
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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ute or regulation is not protected by the DFE.81 A violation
of statutory mandates, even by the United States itself, will
not be protected by the DFE. 2 The exemption allows the
making of policy-based decisions by government employees
without any fear of judicial second-guessing. 8
B. APPLYING THE DFE TO GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC SAFETY
MEASURES
1. Dalehite: The Beginning
The DFE is the source of much controversy. 84 The most
important decision in a long line of cases construing the
DFE is Dalehite v. United States.8 5 In Dalehite the Court held
that the government was not responsible for fatalities or in-
juries resulting from an explosion of fertilizer when the
government had retained control of supervising the storage
of the product.86 The DFE protects government employees
from liability for deliberate policy decisions when the ac-
tion is not mandated by statute, even when the decisions
are in direct contradiction to the demands and desires of
the public. 7
81 Sorenson, supra note 60, at 140; see also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,
536-37 (1988). A discretionary act must be the product of the judgment of the actor
and be based on policy concerns. Sorenson, supra note 60, at 140-41. The purpose
of the DFE is to protect a government official acting in reliance on basic governmen-
tal policies. Bagby & Gittings, supra note 77, at 228. The ability of the actor to make
a choice between action is key in determining if an action is protected. Bagby &
Gittings, supra note 77, at 232-33. The focus is not on the subjective intent of the
actor, but rather on whether the decision and resulting actions can be justified as
based on policy. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
82 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324.
83 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37.
84 Sorenson, supra note 60, at 13841. There have been many attempts to discredit
Dalehite, but Varig Airlines affirmed that the decision in Dalehite is still the controlling
word when it comes to the DFE. Id. at 140.
85 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
86 Id. at 15.
87 Bagby & Gittings, supra note 77, at 223; see also Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (address-
ing the question of extending the DFE to lower level regulators' decisions in their
implementation of policies established by statute). Actions which further the poli-
cies which lie behind a regulation are protected actions within the DFE. Gaubert,
499 U.S. at 324. If a directive leaves an employee no room to choose one action over
another in furtherance of his decision, then that decision is not discretionary. Id. at
322. "Policy discretion often requires an assessment of the practicability or feasibil-
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Presumably this broad protection functions to bar suit
against a government agency such as the FAA for choosing
not to require stringent fire safety measures on aircraft.
The exception focuses on the chilling effect that liability
would have on policy decision makers.8 Once the govern-
ment makes a policy-based decision protected by the excep-
tion, it has a duty to those who will rely on the decision for
their safety to proceed with due care in implementing the
decision. 89
2. Indian Towing: Governmental Liability
Indian Towing Co. v. United States90 illustrates the scope of
this duty.9 In Indian Towing the government was held to
the same standard of care to which an individual would be
held for voluntarily undertaking the maintenance of a light-
house.92 The Court found that once the government had
made the initial decision to maintain lighthouse services,
failure to provide maintenance and upkeep to the light-
house made the government subject to liability under the
FTCA.9 3 The decision in Indian Towing reinforces the prin-
ciple that once the government allows the public to rely on
the protection it offers through its regulatory agencies, it
must use due care to ensure that the protection works. If it
fails to do so, the government is liable under the FTCAY"
This decision represents one side of the debate occurring
presently in the courts over the extent to which the govern-
ity, including the consideration of budgetary constraints, of a proposed course of
action and an assignment of priorities or commitment of resources" and that assess-
ment includes a "conscious weighing, balancing or trading off of competing factors
to evaluate how the public interest will best be served." Bagby, supra note 77, at 253.
88 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 890 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
89 Caplan v. United States, 877 F.2d 1314, 1316 (6th Cir. 1989).
- 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
91 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538.
9 Id.
-' Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69. If an activity does not fall within the DFE, volun-
tary undertaking of that activity will subject the government to tort liability for its
conduct. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act: Time for Reconsideration, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 459, 467 (1989).
94 See Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
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ment can be held liable when it undertakes to ensure the
general well-being of the public.95 Although the govern-
ment has a statutory duty to promote flight safety and to
enact regulatory changes to ensure passenger safety, the
level of responsibility this duty actually entails is unclear.96
Arguably, the duty to promote flight safety encompasses the
assurance of the well-being of the public. Regardless, the
Secretary can delegate practically his entire duty of policing
compliance to the manufacturer, thus creating a self-polic-
ing industry.9 7 This delegation falls within the scope of the
DFE. The problem is that with a spot-checking system con-
ducted by the airline industry, if it is conducted at all, the
chances of the manufactured goods being of premium
quality are slim.98 Given the FAA's immunity from liability
for any injuries due to faulty manufacturing, chances are
even better that the FAA is not monitoring the airline in-
dustry very closely and thus is failing to use due care in ex-
ercising its duty.
91 Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973). There is a split in
authority regarding the government's liability for improper issuance of airworthi-
ness certificates to aircraft which do not meet minimum standards, with some courts
holding the government liable and other courts finding no liability for harm caused
by the government's negligent inspection. See Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 673, vacated, Frankenfield v. United States, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1970).
- 5 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 10,205 (1990). The Administrator of the FAA has the
responsibility for the promotion of flight safety and the implementation of regula-
tory changes which will assure passenger safety. Id. This responsibility extends to all
aircraft which operate in the United States. Id.
97 Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1981); Waymire v.
United States, 629 F. Supp. 1396, 1440-41 (D. Kan. 1986). When the government
delegates to other entities its responsibility for periodic inspection for the duration
of the life of an aircraft that delegation is a discretionary decision protected within
the scope of the DFE. Waymire, 629 F. Supp at 1401.
The Secretary of the FAA is also held to a duty to "perform his powers in a way
that best tends to reduce or eliminate the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air
transportation." 49 U.S.C. § 447 01(c) (1994). In carrying out this function, the Sec-
retary must also "conduct or supervise research to develop a better understanding of
the relationship between human factors and aviation accidents and between human
factors and air safety ... [and] to identify innovative and effective corrective meas-
ures for human errors which adversely affect air safety." 49 U.S.C. § 44505(b)
(1994).
98 Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1027 (1985).
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C. THE DFE As APPLIED TO NEGLIGENT ACTION BY THE
GOVERNMENT
In Varig Airline?9 the Court found that although the FAA
is responsible for monitoring compliance of the airline in-
dustry with safety regulations, the manufacturer holds the
primary responsibility for ensuring that an aircraft complies
with FAA safety regulations.'0 0 Varig Airlines consolidated
two certification cases in which the FAA had allegedly failed
to check specific items in the course of certifying the air-
craft. In one case, an inflight fire occurred in a lavatory
waste receptacle which did not meet standard regulations.
In the second case, a gasoline heater that was not in compli-
ance with federal regulations caught fire. The Court held
that the DFE applied in both cases. 10 1
A strong argument can be made that when the FAA un-
dertakes to ensure compliance with its safety regulations, it
is evaluating the manufacturing procedures of aircraft com-
panies. Where a governmental agency is involved in evalua-
tion as opposed to policy formulation, this conduct is not
immune from liability.'0 2 Consequently, the government's
failure to detect the problems and subsequent issuance of a
compliance certificate should not and would not be pro-
tected. The DFE was not intended to encompass negligent
acts of government employees simply because those em-
ployees relied on policy considerations in acting.' To in-
sulate the government so thoroughly from liability goes
beyond allowing freedom to make policy and borders on
granting permission to conduct operations negligently.
The difference between the two cases evaluated in Varig
Airlines was that in the case of the waste receptacle, the
agency had failed to inspect at all. In the case of the heater,
however, the FAA had inspected, but failed to detect a de-
fect. The Court's apparent indifference to this factual dis-
467 U.S. 797 (1984).
'o Id. at 816.
101 Id. at 820.
02 Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1992).
103 Boone, supra note 62.
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tinction made the DFE appear to apply to even a negligent
inspection.' 4
The Court held that the DFE was "plainly intended to en-
compass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in
its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individu-
als."1 0 5 As a result, the FAA was free from liability when fire
broke out on a plane which the FAA had certified as in
compliance with minimum safety standards.'0 6 The smoke
and fumes from a lavatory fire killed 124 of the 135 passen-
gers aboard the plane. Fortunately for the FAA, this is ex-
actly the type of situation covered by the DFE. Even if the
FAA did issue the certificate of compliance negligently, a
cause of action based upon that negligent behavior is pre-
cluded by the DFE. 107 The FAA has such broad discretion
under the DFE that it may choose to check aircraft thor-
oughly, cursorily, or not at all in policing compliance with
safety precautions. 0
D. SPOT CHECKING TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
The FAA's system of "spot-checking" airplanes to ensure
conformance was formulated under the auspices of the au-
thority of the courts.10 9 The system falls within the protec-
tion of the DFE because it is a decision grounded in the
policy determination of a government agency of the best
way to accommodate the goal of air transportation safety
and the reality of finite agency resources. 110 The FAA is al-
104 Id.
15 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-14.
106 Id. at 815-16.
107 Id.
108 Proctor v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 10, 12 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The Secretary is
allowed broad discretion by Congress to create and activate programs to ensure def-
erence by aircraft manufacturers to safety requirements. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
Section 1423 of title 49 of the U.S.C. gives the Secretary power to issue type certifi-
cates for aircraft. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (1) (1988). Additionally, the Secretary
must either perform or require the manufacturer to perform testing during the
manufacturing process. These tests prove to the FAA that the manufacturer is in
compliance with safety standards. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a) (2) (1988).
109 Proctor, 622 F. Supp. at 12; see also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
110 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 798. The rule is "if a government official in perform-
ing his statutory duties must act without reliance upon a fixed or readily ascertain-
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lowed to balance safety considerations against those of eco-
nomic feasibility.11' According to the FAA, that equation
proves in favor, not of uniform inspection of every plane,
but rather of a system of random checking, the timing of
which is governed by the individual circumstances of each
situation. 112 These lax standards are permitted because
agency judgment lies behind the FAA's decision to forego
inspection.1 3
1. Decision to Spot Check is Discretionary
According to the courts, "[t]he FAA's implementation of
a mechanism for compliance review is plainly discretionary
activity of the nature and quality protected by section
2680(a).""' 4 The FAA made a policy decision to place the
primary responsibility for safety compliance with the air-
plane manufacturer and in Varig Airlines the Court con-
cluded that the decision was a valid one. The ultimate
responsibility for aircraft safety, and the commensurate lia-
bility for aircraft accidents resulting from a breach of that
duty, rests with the aircraft manufacturer rather than with
the government. 115
2. Burden is on the Applicant to Show Compliance
The court in Varig Airlines stated:
By regulation the FAA has made the applicant itself respon-
sible for conducting all inspections and tests necessary to
determine that the aircraft comports with FAA airworthiness
able standard, the decision he makes is discretionary and within the exception of the
[FTCA]." Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979). The excep-
tion protects the ability of a government employee to choose a course of action
based on his assessment of what is best. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 33
(1953).
III Boone, supra note 62.
112 Id.
113 Id.
4 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20 (holding that an agency determination of how
to best oversee safety procedures is basic discretionary regulatory authority); see 49
U.S.C. app. § 2680(c) (1988).
'Is Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 815; Waymire v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 1396,
1402 (D. Kan. 1986); Proctor v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 10, 12 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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requirements. The applicant submits to the FAA the de-
signs, drawings, test reports, and computations necessary to
show that the aircraft sought to be certified satisfies FAA
regulations. In the course of the type certification process,
the manufacturer... conducts both ground and flight tests.
FAA employees or their representatives then review the data
submitted by the applicant and make such inspections or
tests as they deem necessary to ascertain compliance with
the regulations. If the FAA finds that the proposed aircraft
design comports with minimum safety standards, it signifies
its approval by issuing a type certificate.116
If there was a specific and mandatory regulation governing
this review process conducted by the FAA, then the duties
of the agents would be clear and violation or negligent per-
formance of those duties would not be sheltered from lia-
bility by the DFE.1 1
7
In the certification process the manufacturer has the re-
sponsibility of determining what safety issues to examine. 18
This responsibility includes deciding "to dismiss a potential
fault or problem on the basis of risk analysis, by showing
that a failure or combination of failures is so 'extremely im-
probable' that it doesn't have to be guarded against."' 19
The FAA is unique in the extent to which it has delegated
risk analysis to the manufacturers. This delegation places
the responsibility for policing compliance with certification
requirements in the hands of the applicant for certification,
thus placing the burden on the manufacturer to ensure the
safety of the flying public. Arguably, this burden is a shared
one between manufacturers and the FAA. The question is
how much of the burden the FAA actually bears.12 0
116 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805-06.
117 See C.R.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 1993).
I'l A Thorough Critique of Certification of Transport Category Aircraft by the
Federal Aviation Administration, H.R. REP. No. 924, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
119 Id. The manufacturer does a "failure mode and effect analysis" (FMEA) to
determine which failures are to be assumed, examined, and guarded against, and
which are to be deemed "extremely improbable" and dismissed. The FAA has de-




3. Decision That Potential Failure is "Extremely Improbable"
When an applicant elects to treat a potential failure as
extremely improbable, this decision is basic and regula-
tory.1 21 With the FAA's responsibility of assuring compli-
ance of aircraft with safety regulations comes the role of
reviewing the basic assumptions, calculations, and methods
of the manufacturer in his analysis. 12 2 The FAA plays a lim-
ited role in the analytical process and there is question
about whether it even performs this role effectively.1 23 In
other words, the FAA has no idea what standards were used
in the manufacturer's conclusions and thus is poorly
equipped to make a determination of whether the analysis
is reliable.1 24 Since the analysis may never be submitted to
the FAA, the chances are great that the agency may never
see, not to mention approve, the aircraft's compliance, or
lack thereof, with safety standards. 2 5 Any FAR which con-
tains an option to show compliance through extreme im-
probability is a loophole for a manufacturer and the FAA
has delegated away its ability to close the hole or even to
know if the option is being exercised.126 Nonetheless, when
an accident occurs, the manufacturer bears the responsibil-
ity for the failure because the FAA is protected within the
circle of the DFE.
E. B.-RKOVITZ: THE EXCEPTION NARRows
A more recent case has begun to turn the tables on the
government in the area of sovereign immunity. In United
States v. Berkovitz127 the Court specifically rejected the no-
tion that the DFE is a blanket preclusion against liability for
any and all acts arising from regulatory actions by govern-
ment agencies. 128 By defining the focus of the DFE as dis-
121 Id. at 22.
122 Id.
12- Id. at 21.
124 Id. at 22.
125 Id. at 21.
126 Id.
127 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
128 Id. at 538.
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cretionary acts of regulators, as opposed to all acts of
regulators, the Court opened the government to liability in
tort where previously it had been exempted. 129 According
to the Court, whether the DFE applies depends on whether
there was a legitimate exercise of policy decision-making by
the government employee.13 0
The Court, relying on Varig Airlines, held that while some
regulatory decisions involve policy decision-making and dis-
cretionary judgment, not all do. 31 Since the FAA's respon-
sibilities did not require "spot-checking" every aircraft,
according to Varig Airlines, it is within the discretion of the
agency to decide when and where to inspect. 132 The Court
in Berkovitz made clear, however, that both the wording of
the statute and its legislative history indicate that federal
agencies can be liable for their regulatory acts.1 33
By comparing the regulatory scheme in Berkovitz gov-
erning the release of polio vaccines to the spot-checking
scheme in Varig Airlines to police conformance with safety
regulations, the Court found that if there is any leeway for
discretion by the acting official in making policy judgments,
then decisions of the official in the exercise of that judg-
ment fall within the scope of the DFE.1 3 1 If the actions are
prescribed by statute, however, as in Berkovitz, they are not
protected by the exemption.1 35 In the spirit of this deci-
sion, if statutes regulate the standards with which a manu-
facturer must comply before the FAA can issue a type
certificate, the FAA's issuance of that certificate would not
lie within the protection of the DFE.136
The Court has vested the airlines with the power to deter-
mine the safest manner of operation. 37 Implicit in that
- Id. at 539.
13o Id.
13, Id. at 537.
132 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
"13 Id. at 538.
154 Id. at 546.
"'5 Id. at 547.
- Id. at 546.
117 Johnson v. American Airlines, 745 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
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power is the ability to employ broad discretion in choosing
the mode of operation."3 8 If actions are prescribed by stat-
ute, however, and the FAA fails to comply with the regula-
tions in making their decisions, the DFE will not and should
not protect their negligence.1 39
IV. CURRENT STANDARDS FOR FIRE SAFETY
FEATURES
A. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
To date, the effectiveness of the FAA in developing and
implementing new technologies for fire safety is questiona-
ble. According to Donald D. Engen, the Administrator of
the FAA in 1985:
The FAA has explored and continues to explore concepts
that can be implemented to decrease the potential hazards
from an inflight fire. Examples of such improvements are
more fire-resistant seat cushions, cargo liners, interior cabin
materials, handheld fire extinguishers, including the re-
quirement for two Halon 1211 units, the requirement for an
automatic extinguisher in each lavatory trash bin, and a
smoke detector for each lavatory. Improved crew fire-fight-
ing training and smoke evacuation testing are other safety
improvements that will minimize inflight fire threat.1 4
A 1985 crash in Manchester, England, influenced the FAA
to adopt more stringent standards for fire safety,"' and "in
1985, the agency required installation of smoke detectors in
lavatories and galley areas and automatic fire extinguishers
138 Id.
139 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324-25.
4o S. REP. No. 464, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1985) (statement of Donald D. Engen,
Administrator of the FAA). The FAA labels inflight fires "infrequent," "rare," and
"unique." Based on the nature of these fires, the FAA asserts that passengers are the
safest when the crew is allowed to respond to the fire and land the plane as quickly
as possible. Interference by passengers, even in accordance with instructions given
by crewmembers, would delay the landing and endanger the safety of all the occu-
pants of the plane. Id.
141 See Kanamine, supra note 2, at lIA. In the 1985 Manchester, England, acci-
dent, a 737 caught fire on take-off. The plane was engulfed in flames in less than
thirty seconds and fifty-five of 131 passengers died. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 44.
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in lavatory trash bins."1 42 In 1987, cabin safety was further
enhanced when the FAA required commercial airlines to
install two new features: floor lighting along the aisles lead-
ing to the exits in cabins and seats covers manufactured in a
fire-blocking material. 143 Additionally, the walls, ceilings,
storage bins and other large surface areas on all planes built
after August, 1988, must be constructed with more heat re-
sistant materials. 144
Despite these improvements, there were calls in 1993 for
additional research to investigate the fire and smoke resist-
ance of aircraft materials and to produce more resistant
materials for aircraft interiors if necessary.1 45 Also suggested
for study are means of improving fire and smoke contain-
ment systems in the event of an in-flight aircraft fire, meth-
ods to stimulate the production of low flammability fuels by
use of additives, and the enhancement of available technol-
ogies for containment of aircraft fuels which would serve to
minimize post-crash fire hazards. 146 The similarity between
the fire safety problems in 1993 and those of ten years ago
is striking. Obviously the research and development for
this period has been particularly inadequate. 147
The FAA's ineffectiveness over the past decade in making
the skies safe from fire is attributed in some instances to
regulatory policy decisions of and governmental budget
constraints on the DOT which bear no relation to the
FAA. 148 Cutbacks in technical staff and the resulting failure
to keep pace with technological advancements have been
targeted as the unavoidable consequences of the restraints,
and have also adversely affected agency training programs
and long range comprehensive planning. 49
142 See Parker, supra note 46, at A25.
14- See Foran, supra note 46, at 16.
144 See Kanamine, supra note 2, at 5A.
145 49 U.S.C. app. § 1353 (1988) (repealed).
146 Id.
147 S. REP. No. 698, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1988).
148 Id. at 60.
149 Id.
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B. CURRENT SAFETY STANDARDS
The FARs for transport category aircraft require a mini-
mum number of hand fire extinguishers in the passenger
compartments.1 50 The extinguishers must be easily located
and evenly distributed throughout the compartment, with
at least one in the cockpit, one in every cargo or baggage
compartment, and one in each galley.15' The extinguishing
agent in all extinguishers must be of the amount and na-
ture tailored to the types of fire most likely to occur where
the extinguisher is used.1 52
Built-in fire extinguishers are required on all aircraft.
One extinguisher is required in all paper and waste recepta-
cles in each lavatory in order to counter a fire as quickly as
possible.' 53 The goal is to keep crew response time to a
minimum in the event of a fire.154 The agent used in the
extinguishers must be safe in the case of discharge for both
the occupants of the plane and for the structural compo-
nents,1 5 and should be of a volume sufficient to control
any fire likely to occur in the area.1 56
Materials used for the interior of the plane are required,
at a minimum, to be flash-resistant. 157 The large surface ar-
eas of the plane, such as ceilings, walls, and floor and seat
coverings are required to be flame resistant. 5 Moreover,
the trash and waste receptacles must be constructed of fire-
resistance material and must be self-contained in order to
-- 14 C.F.R. § 25.851 (a) (1994) (requiring anywhere from one to eight hand fire
extinguishers, depending on the passenger capacity of the aircraft). See also 14
C.F.R. § 135.155(a),(b),(c) (1994).
151 14 C.F.R. § 25.851(a).
152 Id.
-53 14 C.F.R. § 25.854. The statute sets forth the requirement for smoke detector
systems in each lavatory and for built-in fire extinguishers for each disposal recepta-
cle used for towels, paper or waste, located within the lavatory. The extinguisher
must be fashioned to automatically discharge into each container upon occurrence
of a fire in that receptacle. See also 14 C.F.R. § 121.308(b).
15- 14 C.F.R. § 25.854.
155 14 C.F.R. § 25.851(b).
156 14 C.F.R. § 25.854.
157 14 C.F.R. § 121.215(b).
158 14 C.F.R.§ 121.215(c); see also supra note 26 for a discussion of flash resistant
and flame resistant.
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contain and suffocate any fire which occurs in the
receptacles.1 59
Smoke detectors were not required on aircraft until
1986.160 The present regulations require a detector system
in each lavatory with a warning light and audible warning
connected to the cockpit in order to give warning in case of
fire. 61 The detectors must be manufactured and installed
to withstand vibration, inertia and all other stress to which
they will be subjected during flight, and to do so without
failure. 6 2 They must continue to operate despite contact
with any type of fluid to which they might be exposed, 163
and there must be a sufficient number of fire detectors in
each compartment of the plane to ensure detection of a
fire in that area.' 64
C. FULL-SCALE TESTING OF AIRCRAFT
"Full-scales" are another safety precaution implemented
by the FAA to assure fire safety on every newly manufac-
tured aircraft. 165 Federal regulations require that a plane
loaded to capacity must be able to be evacuated, with only
emergency lighting and half the exits available, within
ninety seconds. 66 "Full-scales" are criticized as "carefully
- 14 C.F.R. § 25.853(f). Fire resistant is defined as the "capacity to withstand the
heat associated with fire at least as well as aluminum alloy" and "the capacity to
perform the intended functions under the heat and other conditions likely to occur
when there is a fire at the place concerned." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1. These materials must
meet the requirements "upon the first substantially complete replacement of the
cabin interior prior to August 20, 1988." 14 C.F.R. § 121.312(a) (3).
'- 14 C.F.R. § 25.854(a); 14 C.F.R. § 121.308(a). The smoke detectors would act
in conjunction with the extinguishers to allow detection of fire and any necessary
actions to prevent rekindling. 14 C.F.R. § 25.854.
61 14 C.F.R. § 25.854(a); 14 C.F.R. § 121.308(a).
162 14 C.F.R. § 121.275.
165 Id.
164 14 C.F.R. § 121.273.
See Nolan, supra note 1, at 30.
"6 Id. When US Air Flight 1493 crashed at Los Angeles International Airport in
1991, the plane was evacuated in less than two minutes, with only four of six exits
available, but not everyone got out in time. Sheryl Stolberg, Crash Raises Questions on
Jet Evacuation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at Al.
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rehearsed shams"'16 7 which perpetuate a "phony 90-second
standard."'68
Investigations indicate that the tests are administered
under conditions not representative of the circumstances in
an actual crash.1 69 For example, the employees who per-
form the test are given two days of training prior to the ac-
tual experiment and the volunteers who participate have
been trained as well.' 70 Moreover, although the tests are
executed in the dark, there are no children or elderly pas-
sengers 17 1 and there is no smoke or element of shock pres-
ent in the tests. Even so, the participants "barely make
it."1 72 "Barely" making it, even after careful rehearsal and
under better than actual conditions, means that only seven
of ninety seconds remain at the end of the test.' 73
This information leads to the conclusion that the tests
the FAA and the airline industry are offering as proof of fire
safety are seriously flawed and only successfully carried out
after days of training and with prior knowledge by the par-
ticipants of which exits are available for use. 174 Under ac-
tual crash conditions, the likelihood of evacuation of a
plane occurring in less than ninety seconds is little to
none. 175 Nonetheless, these tests are offered as proof of the
quality of evacuation procedures. 76
The 1991 disaster at LAX in Los Angeles highlights the
shortcomings of these procedures: there were thirty-four
167 See Nolan, supra note 1, at 44.





172 Id. (quoting Ralph Nader).
17- See Nolan, supra note 1, at 44.
174 Id. In a 1973 evacuation test, video cameras were aimed at the exits that would
be working during the trial run. Although the participants in the test were not fore-
warned of which doors would be operable, the cameras allowed them to go directly
to the working exits, alleviating the need to check doors. There was no danger, as
there would be in an actual disaster, that exits might be inoperable and that passen-
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total deaths in the accident, eighteen of which were attribu-
table to smoke inhalation. 177 Of the eighteen people who
were asphyxiated, only one was not headed for an exit.178
Six bodies were found face down, seven were in the aisle
facing the direction of the rear exit, and four were found
only a few feet from the right wing exit.1 79 These deaths
occurred on a plane which had not been refurbished with
new fire blocking interior cabin materials,18 whose purpose
is to extend the amount of time a passenger has to exit the
aircraft before toxic fumes overtake him.18 1 The materials
were not required to be installed by the airline at the time
of the accident.1 82 The jet was not outfitted with the most
advanced fire retardant wall and ceiling panels which might
have allowed the passengers a few extra seconds to escape
the burning plane and thus saved their lives.' 8 3
The FAA mandates that the airline industry comply with
certain standards and then allows the fulfillment of those
requirements to go unconfirmed. The agency has a policy
that manufacturers must comply with safety standards, and
where a government activity involves safety considerations
under an established policy, as opposed to balancing those
considerations against competing policy factors, the DFE
does not apply. 184 When the FAA requires compliance with
certain standards and reviews to ensure compliance, activity
in violation of that policy will not be sheltered from
liability.' 85
V. PROPOSALS MADE TO INCREASE FIRE SAFETY
The NTSB is responsible for many of the proposals for
more advanced fire safety precautions which the FAA con-
177 See Bunting, supra note 167, at B1.










siders .1 6 The FAA is under no duty to adopt the proposals,
but if it chooses not to, it must provide "conclusive evi-
dence" as to why the preventive measure is either unneces-
sary or impractical.1 17 Advanced safety measures which
have been submitted to the FAA for further research in-
clude visco-modified fuel systems to prevent the fuel from
misting upon impact, thereby reducing the chances of an
explosion and resulting fireball.' Other proposals set
forth by groups such as the non-profit Aviation Safety Insti-
tute and the Association of Flight Attendants are for im-
provements such as a passenger smoke hood or breathing
device, automatic water sprinkler systems, and disconnect
fuel lines." 9 Furthermore, there have been calls for in-
creased aisle space and removal of seats for more accessible
exits, flame-resistant walls and windows, and a halon-based
fire suppression system that would flood the plane and suf-
focate a fire.190
A. PROPOSALS FOR FIREPROOFING CABIN INTERIORS
The cabin walls, floors, and other interior materials must
be made highly fire resistant if the passengers are to be
given a chance to escape a post-crash fire.
1. Intumescent Paint on the Underside of the Plane
There is an intumescent paint available which prevents
the melting of the skin when applied to the underside of
the plane.' 9 ' The paint expands when exposed to heat and
forms a thick insulating layer which prevents the flames
16 Oversight of the FAA: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, S. REP. No. 660, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
72-73 (1988) (statement of Hon. T. Allan McArtor, Administrator of FAA).
187 Id.
18 Id. at 104.
189 See Kanamine, supra note 2, at 1 A.
19 Id.; see also Occupant Protection Standards for Commuter Category Aircraft, 58
Fed. Reg. 38028 (1993); Lee Dye, Feeing the Flames, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, at B3;
Jaclyn Fierman, A Firefighting Polymer Is Winning FAA Favor, FORTUNE, Dec. 10, 1984,
at 128; Nolan, supra note 1, at 42; James Ott, Water Spray System Studies to Improve
Crash Survivability, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 6, 1991, at 29.
191 Nolan, supra note 1, at 40.
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from entering the cabin so quickly, thus allowing the pas-
sengers more time to exit the burning aircraft. 192 The FAA
cites the results of testing as inconclusive and has refused to
require the paint. 193
2. Fire Resistant Cabin Interiors
Since 1957, all cabin interiors which are totally refur-
bished must be furnished with materials meeting stringent
flammability standards. 94 When amendments were passed
in 1986 requiring updated fire safety features, however, the
FAA granted the airline industry a grace period of two years
before manufacturers were required to comply with new
flammability standards for newly built aircraft.1 95 "Replace-
ment" of interior materials does not include the replace-
ment of refurbished decorative materials, provided the
interior materials are placed in the same plane from which
they were taken. 9 6 If, on the other hand, materials are re-
moved and replaced in a rotational manner (removing
them from one plane and refurbishing and installing them
on another plane) this process will qualify as replacement
and have to meet the stricter flammability requirements.' 9 7
Beginning in August 1990, the FAA required the installa-
tion of advanced fire safe ceilings and walls by airline manu-
facturers in all newly crafted planes.198 The major
renovation rule continued to apply to those aircraft cur-
renty in service.199 The FAA also conducted tests on a ma-
terial which would increase the flame-resistance of the
windows by twenty-five per cent, but, according to the
agency, the flame resistant windows were not strong
enough to withstand impact. 20 0
192 Id.
193 Id.




198 See Bunting, supra note 167, at B.
199 See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major
renovation rule.
20 Nolan, supra note 1, at 40.
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3. Flame Resistant Seat Cushions
It is only within the last decade that seat cushion require-
ments have been upgraded to prevent rapid ignition and
propagation of flame from seat to seat.201 Prior to 1983,
flames would devour the cushions, emitting thick black
smoke and toxic fumes, such as carbon monoxide, which
are potentially fatal to humans.0 2 Research indicates that
rapid spread of fire from cushion to cushion contributes
significantly to the suffusion of fire throughout the cabin. 3
The smoldering of the foam which comprises the seat cush-
ions produces various results, all extremely hazardous to
the occupants of the plane-thick black smoke, intense
heat, formation of toxic fumes, and exhaustion of the oxy-
gen supply.204
4. Seat Spacing
A quick and easy method of increasing the evacuation
rate by up to fifteen percent would be to remove a seat in
front of the wing exit, thus providing approximately twenty
inches of additional space. 5 The spacing between seat
rows, or "pitch," has steadily decreased from thirty-four in-
201 See Sun, supra note 12, at 35.
- See Nolan, supra note 1, at 40; see also Flammability Requirements for Aircraft
Seat Cushions, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,188, 43,191 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 25.853),
setting forth a 1984 National Bureau of Standards test which included all world air-
craft accidents where fire was a factor in fatalities. The test summarizes the benefits
of a fire-blocking seat material, finding that there are fire blocking alternatives for
which likely benefits clearly exceed likely costs. Id.
203 FAA Calls for New Seat Requirements for Commuter Category Aircraft, THE WKLY. OF
Bus. AvIATION,July 26, 1993, at 34. A DuPont neoprene foam called Vonar has been
developed and is available which is much less flammable than urethane and there is
also a fabric called Norfab which slows the penetration of heat to the cushion and
also emits fewer toxic fumes and less smoke than conventional fabrics. See Nolan,
supra note 1, at 41; see also Sun, supra note 12, at 35, 36. As of 1983, the FAA still had
made no recommendations for new products for seat cushions. The airline industry
has attempted to delay implementation of any new fabrics because they are too
heavy. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 41.
04 Foss & Tepper, supra note 9, at 818. Burning foam can deplete oxygen levels
substantially in a short period of time, creating conditions that are often fatal. Addi-
tionally, the temperatures produced by burning plastic often reach up to 900 de-
grees centigrade, a temperature which although producing only a small layer of
smoke, is also fatal. Id. at 818, 819.
205 See Stolberg, supra note 165, at Al.
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ches to the current standard of twenty-nine inches as the
airlines have struggled to make ends meet by squeezing in
more and more customers.2 °6 Proposals have been made to
remove exit aisle seats completely in order to allow extra
space in an evacuation, but none have been adopted. 7
B. PROPOSALS FOR AUTOMATIC EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS
1. Water Spray System
In the event of a fire, an automatic water spray system
ejects a very fine mist diffused throughout the cabin. 8
The mist deters the spread of fire and decreases the
amount of smoke and intensity of the heat in the cabin,
thus allowing for a substantial increase in evacuation time
for passengers in a post-crash fire.209 The obvious benefit
of the water spray system is the reduction in fire-related fa-
talities.210 The incremental increase in weight is a key is-
sue211  and the argument that the increased weight
disadvantage is overshadowed by the number of lives saved
is not likely to influence the industry. 2  The focus of the
airline carriers is so narrowly trained on cost reduction and
strict cost-benefit analysis that most of the current research
on water spray systems is concentrated in the area of weight
reduction.2 13  Another potential problem is the possibility
of the fuselage breaking into pieces during a crash. 4
Crumbling of the structure of the plane's fuselage on im-
pact could obviously dismantle the entire system by damag-
ing command apparatus and rupturing tubing.215 A trigger
- See Nolan, supra note 1, at 43.
207 See Stolberg, supra note 165, at Al.
- Ott, supra note 189, at 29.
- Id. One proposed system is comprised of a number of watertanks connected to
a series of nozzles throughout the cabin. In the event of a fire, a fine mist is dis-
charged from as many as 120 nozzles in a narrow body aircraft. Sam Elliott, Damping
Down the Fires, FLIGHT INT'L, Feb. 11, 1992, at 46.
210 Id.
211 Ott, supra note 189, at 29.





system designed to cause discharge automatically upon
damage to the operating system could overcome this
problem.2 16
2. Halon-Based Flood Systems
Investigations by the FAA into automated extinguisher
systems similar to lavatory receptacle systems have proved
fruitless.2 17 Although systems are available and some are
even in use in engine compartments and lavatories aboard
commuter planes, no system is required to extinguish a fire
in the passenger compartment. 218 The system functions by
flooding the compartment with halon gas upon detection
of any potential eruption, immediately quenching the
fire. 219 The weight is prohibitive-the system weighs 2000
pounds-but the advantages overshadow the costs. 22 0 An-
other potential drawback of the system is its potential effect
on the ozone.2 21  The airline industry, however, is con-
cerned primarily with the costs of outfitting a plane with
the Halon suppression system.22 Finally, the effectiveness
of the system in a high impact accident is questionable. 23
It is possible that if the fuselage breaks apart the system
would also be destroyed and the gas would escape.2 24
C. PROPOSALS FOR FIRE-RESISTANT BREATHING DEVICES
The oxygen mask allows in ambient air and is no protec-
tion in a smoke-filled compartment, because the wearer
continues to breathe toxic fumes.22 5 A smoke hood, on the
216 Id.
217 Dye, supra note 189, at B3.
218 Id.
219 Id.
-2 Nolan, supra note 1, at 53.
221 Dye, supra note 189, at B3.




225 Parker, supra note 46, at A25. The oxygen mask cannot protect a passenger
from smoke and toxic fumes; it only provides sufficient oxygen to allow a passenger
to breathe at very high altitudes. Dye, supra note 189, at B3.
1994] 401
402 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
other hand, is a plastic bag which is slipped over the passen-
ger's head.226 Cinching the thick, fire resistant bag closed
around the neck shuts out toxic fumes.227 The idea was
proposed in 1969, but was withdrawn in the midst of vigor-
ous protests by air carriers that the hoods would actually
hamper evacuation time.22 18 The airlines maintained that
the time passengers would spend trying to get the hoods on
would be better spent trying to evacuate the plane 229 and
that people would be overcome with smoke while struggling
with the hoods.230
The smoke hoods would be an inexpensive solution to
the problem of evacuation time, but the FAA has refused to
experiment with the device.231 At a cost of $400 each, ad-
ding smoke hoods on flights would increase the price of an
average ticket by less than fifty cents. 23 2
D. FUEL SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS
Evacuation may be more severely impeded by explosions
of fuel tanks after the crash than by the actual fire. 23' The
fire is intensified by the explosion, thus increasing smoke,
fire, and toxic fumes and making safe evacuation less
likely.234 There are means to prevent these explosions and
to delay spread of post-crash fire, such as vent flame arrest-
ers and surge tank explosion suppression systems. 23' These
devices will prevent explosion resulting from ground fire in
an undamaged fuel system. 236 There is also a process by
which fuel traveling from tank to engine can be shut off if
226 Dye, supra note 189, at B3.
227 Id.
228 Nolan, supra note 1, at 43.
229 Id.
2- Dye, supra note 189, at B3.
221 Id.
232 Id.
233 Implementation of SAFER Propulsion System Recommendations, 49 Fed. Reg. 38,078
(1984). A passenger may be overcome by the toxic smoke from burning fuel in as
little as a few seconds. S. REP. No. 660, supra note 185, at 104.
234 S. REP. No. 660, supra note 185, at 104.
225 Id.
22 Implementation of SAFER Propulsion System Recommendations, 49 Fed. Reg. 38,078,
38,079 (1984).
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necessary in an accident,237 and a fuel additive which makes
the kerosene less flammable by preventing the fuel from
forming the highly flammable mist.238
VI. CONCLUSION
The means to prevent fire in the event of an airplane ac-
cident exist and in some cases have been available for years.
Because of the lax attitude of the FAA in enforcing safety
precautions, the industry can choose to ignore the available
technologies and suffer no repercussions.3 ° In the absence
of action by the FAA, it is the responsibility of the legisla-
ture to provide the flying public with the security and safety
which it expects.2 14  If in doing so Congress strips away a
portion of the FAA's immunity, such are the consequences
of the FAA's languid approach to fulfilling its duty to en-
sure the safety of airline passengers. The impact of cases
2-7 Id. The FAA is also examining reinforced fuel tanks designed to withstand
impact without rupturing and "breakaway" fuel lines capable of self-sealing to pre-
vent the leakage of highly flammable jet fuel. Broder & Houston, supra note 36, at
18. A fuel tank shutoff system is currently being employed in some airplanes and
with little effort could be installed on all aircraft. Implementation of SAFER Propulsion
System Recommendations, 49 Fed. Reg. 38,078, 38,079 (1984). The breakaway fuel
lines are designed to provide a shutoff valve capable of activation from the cockpit in
the event of emergency conditions and the lines would self-seal upon impact. S.
REP. No. 660, supra note 185, at 99. Many manufacturers oppose the fittings, how-
ever, and consider the risk of a breakaway fuel line that breaks away in turbulence,
shutting off the flow of fuel to the engines, to be a greater risk to commercial avia-
tion than the chance of a line breaking after a crash. Parker, supra note 46, at A25.
238 See Fierman, supra note 189, at 128. Two fuel additives are available which are
designed to prevent a highly flammable kerosene mist from forming when a plane
crashes. One is Avgard and the other is FM-9. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 42. Both
additives operate to prevent fuel from misting upon impact by using methods which
change the molecular structure of the fuel and keep it in the form of large droplets.
See Fierman, supra note 189, at 128; Nolan, supra note 1, at 39.
239 See Nolan, supra note 1, at 30; see also supra notes 185-237 and accompanying
text for a discussion of proposed safety changes and the FAA's lack of
responsiveness.
240 Sam Fulwood III, Panel to Push FAA for Better Safety in Burning Aircraft, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at A42. "Our government is teetering on the brink of criminal
negligence because it fails to require that planes contain the safest materials." Id.
Legislators have promised strong action against the FAA to force quick implementa-
tion of new safety regulations. These regulations are intended to give air travelers
more time to evacuate a burning airplane. Id. But see supra notes 59-138 and ac-
companying text discussing the Discretionary Function Exception.
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such as Berkovitz is uncertain. On the one hand, the deci-
sion may lead to a more cautious FAA and more thorough
inspection of aircraft before certification. 4 1 On the other
hand, the agency may feel compelled to abandon, or
greatly curtail, its role as guardian of public safety.2 42
The FAA has gone so far as to admit its leniency in re-
quiring every feasible fire safety precaution 24 3 and as re-
cently as 1991 promised to enact new regulations that
would allow improvements such as additional space around
the emergency exits.244 True to form, however, the FAA al-
lowed the airlines a delay in implementation and there are
still thousands of planes flying without the most advanced
safety technology. In all likelihood those planes will con-
tinue to operate dangerously until there is a major renova-
tion of their interiors. 45 It is entirely possible that in 1997
some planes will be flying without the most advanced
technology. 246
The predictable reaction of the industry to any pressure
from the FAA would be to protest the requirements and
appeal for delays and relaxation of standards. Their typical
argument is unavailability of materials or prohibitive cost.2 47
Delays granted to the airline industry to install the fire
safety interiors demonstrate the FAA's unwillingness to
crack down on safety standards. They are acting more as a
management consultant than a regulatory agency, with
their chief concern being cost-effectiveness rather than
safety. 24 8 "They want to impose as little cost as possible on
the carriers . . . . Basically, the industry is running the
program. 249
241 Boone, supra note 62, at 607.
242 Id.
243 See Fulwood, supra note 239, at A42.
244 Id.
245 See Kanamine, supra note 2, at 1 A.
246 Fulwood, supra note 239, at A42.
247 Broder & Houston, supra note 36, at 18.
248 Nolan, supra note 1, at 48.
249 Bunting, supra note 167, at BI (quoting Chris Witkowski, Director of Aviation
Consumer Action Project).
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The immunization of the government from liability for
harm inflicted directly or indirectly as a result of agency de-
cision making seems to have set in motion a trend toward
the relaxation of responsibility by government officials in
carrying out their duties. 5 ° A disaster flowing from circum-
stances over which the government has control is a danger
against which the public cannot protect itself.251 When the
negligence or carelessness of a government official can be
clothed in public policy or language of discretion to un-
justly escape liability, the public victim is left with no re-
course against the cause of his injury. Consequently, the
possibility of escape from liability has lured the government
to use the FCA and its DFE exemption to defend against
cases where the official exercised a less than reasonable
standard of care in performing his duties.252
If a government officer acts without due care for the well-
being of the public, there is no legitimate excuse for al-
lowing that action to fall within the scope of the DFE.253
Good policy dictates that we cannot allow officials to carry
out their duties carelessly, no matter what the balance of
economics against safety.2 54
The FAA's response to this criticism is that chances are
almost 100% that a flight will take place without incident.
Given these statistics, the costs, both economically and in
terms of manpower, to provide substantial measures of
safety beyond those already in place are unacceptable.255
25 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 50 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 48.
252 Id. at 50. There is a distinguishable difference between a discretionary deci-
sion which is properly implemented and protected by the DFE and one which is
negligently executed through non-discretionary activities. Bagby & Gittings, supra
note 77, at 246. Dalehite clearly sets out the boundaries for protection of efforts in
furtherance of policy-based decisions. Nonetheless, if the actions are negligent, they
should not be protected. Id.
253 Dalhite, 346 U.S. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2- Id. at 58.
255 Donald D. Engen, The FAA and Airline Safety, MLAMI HERALD, Sept. 1, 1985, at
IE (Engen was the Administrator of the FAA at this point). The FAA asserts that
there are no documented deaths attributable to inflight fires aboard U.S. carriers
and that inflight fires which actually develop into a danger to the passengers are
rare. S. REP. No. 464, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1985).
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The ratio is hundreds of millions of dollars to a few lives,
and in the view of the FAA, the costs outweigh the bene-
fits. 25 6 If the improvements save thirty lives over a fifteen
year period,257 the costs of the programs are six times the
benefits, according to the FAA. 258 The fiscal considerations
are key, and "if it's cheaper to kill you than to fix it, they'll
kill you. 259
The FAA has "insisted that it would be 'extraordinarily
expensive' for airlines to equip their entire fleets with state-
of-the-art, flame-resistant interiors. 2 60 The government es-
timates a cost of $4.7 billion over twenty years to revamp the
entire American fleet, including lost revenues and remodel-
ing expenses. 261 The cost of crashworthiness improvements
must be considered in light of what the airlines do spend
money on-$1.5 million per plane in 1984 to improve the
paint jobs and interiors and $8 million on honey-roasted
peanuts. 262 The most effective improvements are those the
airlines consider to be the least valuable, opting instead for
an attractive public relations program to put the public's
256 See Broder & Houston, supra note 36, at 18. The primary aim of the FAA is to
make sure that the cost of improving flight safety is equalled or exceeded by the
financial benefit of providing the improvements. S. REP. No. 464, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 39 (1985) (statement of Donald D. Engen, Administrator). Safety standards set
down by the FAA are such that money-conscious executives can shave safety meas-
ures up to a point where they are still functioning within regulatory limits, but are
not necessarily operating safely. S. REP. No. 25, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1987)
(statement of Capt. Henry A. Duffy).
217 Broder & Houston, supra note 36, at 18.
258 Id. The costs of the program are $6 million per life, and the FAA assigns the
value to a life at only $1 million. Id.
259 Nolan, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting Harry Robertson, an aviation crash
survivability expert).
26 Fulwood, supra note 239, at A42.
261 Id. Estimating that a life is worth $500,000 and that there will be 80 deaths
every 10 years, 20 of which can be prevented by improved fire safety precautions, the
cost to the industry of not making the improvements is $10 million, or $1 million
per year. The cost over a ten year period of making the improvements to save those
20 lives, however, is $20 million for new seats, $2 million for new upholstery, $5
million for extra fuel, and $50 million revenue loss if seats were removed to allow
better egress. The total cost of over $75 million to outfit the planes with improved
fire blocking materials far outweighs the $10 million it would cost to let the 20 peo-
ple die. Therefore, a good business decision would be not to make the improve-
ments. Nolan, supra note 1, at 50-51.
262 Nolan, supra note 1, at 53.
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mind at ease about the safety of flying.263 All of the im-
provements which would reduce fatalities in the event of an
accident and post-crash fire-smoke hood, fuel additives
and flame arresters-are considered too costly by the air-
line industry.264 The absurdity of the FAA's whole argu-
ment is that what the airlines term an "industry cost" is in
fact passed on through ticket prices to the paying passen-
ger.2 65 The airlines refuse to pay for precautions which
would in fact cost them little or nothing.
Economic factors cannot prevail when the government
has undertaken the role of ensuring the general well-being
of the public. In the case of the FAA, the DFE allows for
too much attention to fiscal matters with too little liability
for the harm which occurs as a result of ignoring safety
concerns.
266
A less flexible standard whereby the FAA is held responsi-
ble for the decisions it makes concerning public safety will
prevent the hands-off approach that the FAA has thus far
adopted. By requiring the FAA to adopt a policy which
must be adhered to when reviewing manufacturer compli-
ance with safety measures, the legislature will ensure that
the actions of the FAA in promoting flight safety will be per-
formed with due care. 267 The courts' measurement of the
actions of the agency against the prescribed procedures will
be outside the realm ofjudicial "second-guessing" and thus
will not violate the spirit or the letter of the DFE.268
26 See Broder & Houston, supra note 36, at 18.
264 Id.
265 S. REP. No. 464, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1985) (statement of Donald D.
Engen).
2- Id. at 58.
267 See C.R.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 1993).
26 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814.
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